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AbstractThis paper documents the experiences of assurance 
evaluation during the early stage of a large software development 
project. This project researches, contracts and integrates privacy-
respecting  software  to  business  environments.  While  assurance 
evaluation  with  ISO  15408  Common  Criteria  (CC)  within  the 
certification schemes is done after a system has been completed, 
our approach executes evaluation during the early phases of the 
software  life  cycle.    The  promise  is  to  increase  quality  and  to 
reduce  testing  and  fault  removal  costs  for  later  phases  of  the 
development process. First results from the still-ongoing project 
suggests that the Common Criteria can define a framework for 
assurance evaluation in ongoing development projects. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There  exist  several  approaches  to  ensure  the  quality  of 
secure software. Some of these approaches have the focus of 
quality  assurance  at  a  very  early  stage  of  the  development 
process  and  have  weaknesses  to  ensure  the  quality  of  this 
process until the product is ready to enter the market. Other 
approaches, like the CC, focus on inspection, or more concrete 
evaluation, of ready-to-market products. We tried to introduce 
an  inspection  process  that  is  inspired  by  the  CC  evaluation 
scheme to earlier phases of the software engineering process.  
Our newly developed approach tries to bridge the gap between 
requirements  engineering,  code  production  and  post-
evaluation. This is motivated by two effects we expect: First, 
faults discovered earlier can be removed faster, and second, 
they can be removed cheaper. To show our point, we first have 
a look at testing, verification and validation literature from the 
software engineering field on knowledge. Then we will briefly 
introduce  the  Common  Criteria  scheme.  Following  this,  we 
describe  our  process  approach  to  detect  security  assurance 
problems in the ongoing development process. In the end, we 
give some first experience from the process application in a 
large security software development project. 
A.  Cost of Testing 
First,  we  will  deal  with  the  question  whether  early  testing 
efforts  in  secure  software  development  are  economically 
justified or not. Early testing introduces cost into the design 
phase - and it might not be trivial to find evidence whether it is 
worth the investment. 
In  the  literature,  one  can  clearly  identify  that  early  fault 
removal is more economic than late fault removal. Although 
on  first  sight,  one  might  conclude  that  early  testing  and 
validation  simply  shifts  testing  cost  to  designers  and 
developers,  some  economic  evidence  exists  that  due  to 
network externalities, code re-use and the software engineering 
process, early failure detection is notably cheaper than later 
failure  removal.  In  [1],  the  cost  of  fault  removal  during 
different phases of software engineering increase exponentially 
as listed in Table 1. 
Phase  Cost 
Requirements  10 $ 
Analysis  20 $ 
Design  30 $ 
Code  50 $ 
Testing  200 $ 
Install  800 $ 
End User  1500 $ 
Table 1: Cost of fault removal in software engineering 
according to [1]. 
Here, early fault removal clearly is much cheaper than later 
fault removal.. 
 
An economic model of bug removal is constructed in [2], 
where the authors gather evidence for the argument that early 
bug removal is more efficient than later testing and removal.  
B.  Testing, Verification and Validation 
In  this  part,  we  focus  on  fault  prevention  rather  than  fault 
correction.  We  looked  at  several  approaches  to  deal  with 
testing.  The  United  States  of  America  National  Aeronautics 
and  Space  Administration  (NASA)  hat  a  strict  standard  on 
software quality [3].  In section 3.2.1.2.1 of the document, the 
mission  of  software  assurance  is  defined  in  this  way:  A 
strategy that emphasizes prevention, not correction. 
In [4], a consulting firm suggests to use CC elements for early 
software validation due to the fact that the CC provide a large 
variety of standardized information and processes on security 
vulnerabilities.  An example of using the CC during a software 
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development process can be found in [5], where a Palm pda 
software has been developed using a process based on the CC 
requirements. 
C.  Common Criteria 
The Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, short CC, 
provide  a  collection  of  generic  components  of  security 
requirements to aid in the specification of product or system 
security attributes. The current version 2.21 is similar to the 
ISO (International Organization for Standardization) standard 
15408. The traditional utilization of the CC is the usage as the 
basis for evaluations of security properties of IT-systems and 
software. The main objective of the CC, besides a well known 
and excepted standard, is the evaluation of products. This can, 
among other purposes, be used to provide users and customers 
a decision support base if this evaluated object meets the own 
requirements. Examples for evaluated Products are Smartcards 
from the credit card sector2. 
The  CC  advise  to  produce  Protection  Profiles  (PP)  and 
Security  Targets  (ST).  PPs  are  an  implementation-
independent  set  of  security  requirements  for  a  category 
(application  specific)  of  Target  of  Evaluations  (TOE)  that 
meet specific consumer needs. On the other hand STs are an 
implementation-dependent  set  of  security  requirements  and 
specifications used as the basis for evaluation of the identified 
TOE. An ST  can be compared to the corresponding PPs to 
assess whether the postulations of the PP are met. 
Preferably, the CC shall support the developers to meet the 
postulated  requirements  right  from  the  beginning  of  the 
development process. But until now this policy is not a formal 
defined part of the ISO 15408 standard. 
II.  EARLY SECURITY VALIDATION WITH CC 
Our approach is to adapt the principles of the CC of building 
PPs  and  STs  during  the  development  process  without  the 
standardized components of the CC, but properly reflecting the 
security requirements which have been defined for the project 
products. The comparison of ST and PP already during the 
development  revealed  different  lacks  which  have  been 
reported to the developers to solve the problems until the next 
evaluation loop. From the perspective of the project, this early 
involvement of evaluators offered the chance to fix problems 
with a lower cost, effort and to fulfill the high self-expectations 
and the expectations of the commission and the future users.  
A.  Evaluation and the Common Criteria 
The  basis  of  the  evaluation  process  is  the  current  official 
version 2.2 of the Common Criteria (CC, IS 15408). Essential 
for developers is the reading of the Common Methodology 
for  Information  Technology  Security  Evaluation  [6].  This 
document  describes  the  methodology  of  different  evaluation 
assurance levels (EAL) including lists of necessary activities. 
 
1  Common  Criteria  Project:  The  Common  Criteria,  Version  2.2,  2004, 
similar to IS 15408: 2004. 
2  A  list  of  PPs  and  evaluated  products  can  be  found  under 
www.commoncriteriaportal.org. 
Following the methodology of the CC the assurance through 
evaluation has several meanings, and the following list can be 
seen as a basis of the CC evaluation [7]: 
a) analysis and checking of process(es) and procedure(s); 
b)  checking  that  process(es)  and  procedure(s)  are  being 
applied; 
c)  analysis  of  the  correspondence  between  Target  of 
Evaluation (TOE) design representations; 
d)  analysis  of  the  TOE  design  representation  against  the 
requirements; 
e) verification of proofs; 
f) analysis of guidance documents; 
g)  analysis  of  functional  tests  developed  and  the  results 
provided (by the software developer); 
h) independent functional testing; 
i) analysis for vulnerabilities (including flaw hypothesis); 
j) penetration testing. 
The process of the evaluation is an integrated process over the 
whole life cycle including the planning of a software project, 
developing and integrating of components, installing and using 
the software. So, the above listed elements of an evaluation are 
far from being complete, but the different evaluation assurance 
levels  extend  the  evaluation  basis  by  the  assurance  aspects 
described in [7]. 
The  evaluation  of  the  project  components  is  not  bound  to 
certain  evaluation  levels  and  all  the  formal  regulations,  but 
developers and evaluators have to agree on a defined level. 
From  the  evaluation  point  of  view  the  general  conditions 
should follow the requirements of the evaluation level 4. This 
recommendation  is  caused  by  the  project  technical  design 
principles that state very clearly that the maximum of privacy 
shall be achieved and to ensure that the principles are fulfilled 
we need a high level of assurance. 
However,  the  discussion  about  which  level  of  assurance  is 
needed  has  to  be  initiated  before  the  next  evaluation  cycle 
starts and we want to invite everybody to contribute to this 
process. Nevertheless the contribution of a delegation of the 
evaluators  is  mandatory  to  come  to  an  agreement.  As  an 
example, the required assurance level for electronic signatures 
under  the  electronic  signature  directive  is  EAL4+,  while  a 
smart card reader for patient data is only tested according to 
EAL3. 
B.  Experience with CC based project evaluation 
The first cycle of the assurance evaluation according to the 
Common  Criteria  (CC)  could  not  be  performed  yet  for  the 
version  1  prototype  in  its  earl  stage.  This  was  caused  by 
several reasons. First, our analysis showed that the discrepancy 
between the needed and the available documentation was too 
high.  We  investigated  this  phenomenon  and  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  developers  and  evaluators  have  a  different 
view on what an evaluation is. This is a commonly observable 
problem while having teams of specialists in different domains 
cooperating on projects. An interesting approach is to use a 
prototype  as  a  boundary  object  to  come  to  a  common 
perspective  about  the  requirements  regarding  the  prototype 
[8]. To build a boundary object for evaluation could be a great 
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to agree about the boundary conditions of evaluations within 
the project. 
Moreover,  the  assurance  evaluators  detected  discrepancies 
between  different  statements  provided  by  the  component 
developers and the integrators about the implementation stage 
of security functionalities during the preparation phase of the 
evaluation. This problem seems to be caused by two associated 
circumstances. The starting points were integration problems 
which  resulted  in  deviations  from  the  integration time plan. 
Thus,  the  deviation  created  stress  and  inhibited  adequate 
communication  between  component  developers  and 
integrators.  Thereby,  the  component  developers  had  no 
updated information whether their component was integrated 
or not. 
Secondly,  the  implemented  security  functionalities  of 
prototype  version  1  are  not  as  fully  implemented  as  would 
have  been  necessary  for  a  successful  assurance  evaluation. 
Especially the lack of some basic security functionality which 
was omitted for undocumented reasons were strong points of 
critique. 
Of primary importance were the questions how to deal with the 
inaccurate documentation and the lack of important security 
functionalities.  Facing  these  problems,  the  assurance 
evaluators came to the decision of suspending the evaluation 
process and instead starting to prepare the evaluation process 
of  version  2,  and  educating  he  developers  better  about 
assurance preconditions.  
We will now describe the pre-conditions that must be fulfilled 
by  the  different  parties  to  enable  the prototype to enter the 
evaluation process to avoid future confusions. This guidance is 
intended for programmers, documentation writers and project 
managers that work on component design and implementation, 
or on integration. In the broader sense, this is also the path for 
the  preparation  of  the  evaluation  processes  of  the  future 
prototypes.  We  expect  at  least  two  more  cycles  of  security 
evaluation before the development is finished. 
C.  Basic Preconditions for an Evaluation 
This section describes the basic needed preconditions for an 
evaluation  of  the  project  software  in  general,  but  with  the 
focus  on  the  integrated  prototype.  Under  the  notion 
precondition  we  summarize  all  documentation  that  an 
evaluator needs to accomplish a basic evaluation process in an 
integrated manner like it is described above. 
The following sections describe in detail which documentation 
an evaluator will expect for: 
Implemented security functions. 
·  Threat  analysis,  countermeasures,  strength  of  the 
implementation. 
·  Test plans. 
·  Best practice examples for the application prototype 
on how to use the provided interfaces. 
D.  Implemented Security Functions 
An  evaluation  requires  a  list  of  the  implemented  security 
functionalities. This includes on the component level a list of 
what  kind  of  security  functionalities  are  implemented 
including the specification (e.g. kind of encryption algorithm, 
description  of  the  distribution  of  the  keys  and  the  storage), 
which countermeasure secures against what kind of threat in 
which expected strength.  
On the level of the prototype, a description of the interaction 
of the different components is mandatory.  
E.  Threat Analysis 
Threat  and  vulnerability  analyses  are  one  of  the  most 
important parts of the preparation material for an evaluation. 
The approach of a vulnerability analysis is to find weaknesses 
of the security of a system or parts of the system. 
The  threat  analysis  is  based  on  the  perceptions  of  the 
vulnerability  and  characterizes  the  possible  effects  of  the 
found  weaknesses.  The  documentation  empowers  the 
evaluators to understand the background of implementations 
and to come to an assessment if the known possible threats can 
be counter measured by the implemented security functions. 
Following the CC part 3 [7] vulnerabilities can arise through 
failures in: 
a)  Requirements    that  is,  an  IT  product  or  system  may 
possess all the functions and features required of it and still 
contain vulnerabilities that render it unsuitable or ineffective 
with respect to security; 
b) Construction  that is, an IT product or system does not 
meet  its  specifications  and/or  vulnerabilities  have  been 
introduced as a result of poor constructional standards or 
incorrect design choices; 
c) Operation  that is, an IT product or system has been 
constructed  correctly  to  a  correct  specification  but 
vulnerabilities  have  been  introduced  as  a  result  of 
inadequate control upon the operation of it. 
A possible, and from our point of view, adequate presentation 
of a threat analysis can be found below. 
Example: communication 
List of components 
Compon
ents 
name:  
Compone
nts 
number: 
Interacts  with 
the  following 
components: 
Description: 
communi
cation 
C_1  Event manager  Responsible  for 
the  communi-
cation  between 
the  users, 
service 
providers  and 
internal 
communication. 
 
List of threats 
Number  of  the 
threat: 
Description: 
T_1  Communication  can  be  eavesdropped 
(and  analysis  provides  meaningful 
results). 
T_2  Communication partners can be revealed 
to a third party 
T_3  Communication can be altered 
T_4  Communication  partners  can  forge  their 
identity. 
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List of countermeasures 
Number  of 
counter-
measure: 
Description of 
countermeasure: 
Eases 
impact of 
threat 
number: 
Strength: 
(low  / 
medium  / 
high) 
CM_1  Use  of  encryption 
mechanism  like 
3DES and AES 
T_1, T_3  High 
CM_2  Use of authentication 
mechanism  like 
certificates  
T_4  Medium 
CM_3  Use  of  Mixes  and 
dummy traffic 
T_2  Medium  / 
High 
F.  Test Plans 
Test  plans  have  multiple  dimensions.  The  first  dimension 
concerns the components, the integration and the system as it 
is for example described in [9]. Each of these levels has to be 
tested and the tests have to be documented. 
The  second  dimension  covers  the  testing  of  security 
functionalities, tests of the interfaces to later on used parts of 
the project and handling of unexpected situations (e.g. test of 
stability of the programs if these programs are contacted with 
unexpected enquiries). 
 
The documentation of the tests covers: 
·  The character of the conducted test (e.g. functionality, 
security or stability test). 
·  Scope of the test (e.g. tested components, interaction 
with other parts of the project software). 
·  The  documentation  of  the  test  procedure.  This 
includes  the  test  configuration  including  the  used 
tools and the underlying infrastructure inclusive test 
criteria and conditions that describe why tests have 
been terminated. 
G.  The documentation of the test results. 
A suitable test standard is the IEEE standard 829-1998 IEEE 
Standard  for  Software  Test  Documentation  [10]  which 
accurately describes the composition of test plans and offers 
standardized documents to support the efficiency of the test 
team and additionally the evaluators. 
H.  Enforcement of the Evaluation 
We will evaluate the next versions of the prototype by using 
the  following  evaluation  model.  In  this  section  we  describe 
why this approach was changed for the integrated prototype 
version 1. 
 
1)  Process One 
The starting point is the test release of the prototype Version 2. 
This  provides  an  overview  of  the  security  and  privacy 
functionalities.  The  next  step  is  to  identify  the  integrated 
components. For each component we will do an examination 
of its contribution to privacy and security. 
This contains in detail: 
What is the purpose of the component (e. g. what the benefit of 
the implementation for the end-user is)? The main sources for 
this are the project- architecture-deliverables. 
What are the possible threats? We will do such an analysis for 
the input of the developers and create our own threat approach. 
For each privacy goal, there might exist several threats. Hence, 
we  want  to  summarize  how  the  targeted  benefit  of  each 
component  can  be  weakened  or  totally  neutralized  through 
different threats. This detailed analysis considers the fact that a 
system is only as strong as its weakest part. 
For the last two items we need input from the developers of the 
components,  who  provide  their  threat  analysis  and 
countermeasures as described above. The approach do create 
our  own  threat  analysis  may  lead  to  a  more  complete 
presentation. 
The next step is to analyze the specifications. The purpose is 
to  evaluate  if  the  provided  functionalities can deal with the 
investigated threats. This should result in a first indication of 
whether the prototype fulfils the claimed requirements or not. 
To be able to compare the investigated requirements we have 
to build a security target (ST) for the integrated prototype. 
 
2)  Process Two 
Starting from the requirements postulated in the requirements 
deliverable, the evaluators have to summarize and structure the 
requirements  regarding  the  integrated  prototype.  In  the  first 
iteration this will not be as formalized as it is claimed in the 
Common Criteria. This will be a further step towards creating 
protection profiles.  
Further on, the next task is to create a lightweight Protection 
Profile (PP). The notation lightweight was chosen, because 
it  may  not  fit  the  formalized  requirements  of  the  Common 
Criteria provided that the postulated requirements would apply 
one-to-one  without  transformation  into  the  structure  of 
functional components of the CC. So, the lightweight PP will 
reflect  the  basic  requirements  [11]  like  unlinkablity, 
pseudonymity,  repudiation  building  and  anonymous 
communication in natural language and it will provide a TSF 
(TOE Security Functionality) description according to the CC. 
 
3)  Joint Process 
To combine the two previous parallel processes the evaluators 
have to compare the Protection Profile of the users point of 
view and the security target of the components. At this point 
the  evaluators  have  to  analyze  if  the  postulations  of  the 
protection profile meet the requirements of the security target. 
This  operation  can  be  understood  as  a  mapping  of  the  two 
constructs.  Due to the deviation of the lightweight PP from the 
formalized  requirements  of  the  CC  the  mapping  is  more  a 
global examination whether the ST claims conformance with 
the  PP  than  a  real  conformance  check.  Nevertheless,  this 
should lead to an assessment in how far the prototype meets 
the postulated requirements. At the end of this joint process it 
is  possible  to  get  to  a  conclusion  about  the  quality  of 
implementation of the integrated prototype. 
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Figure 1 Process to evaluate the integrated prototype 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Even  without  successfully  conducting  the  first  evaluation 
cycle,  the  main  conclusion  of  the  iteration  of  the  assurance 
evaluation  process  is  that  the  developers  had  difficulties  to 
meet the expectations of the evaluators. Overall threat models, 
security mechanisms and code re-use analysis was not done. 
Some components had nothing but a claim about their security 
functionality, but no documentation. They missed to document 
their threat and risk analysis and had to face many integration 
difficulties. In addition the lack of communication among the 
developers  and  between  developers  of  the  components  and 
integrators, this led to a dissatisfying first judgment about the 
current  step  of  implementation.  The  suggestions  of  the 
evaluators  are  that  the  developers  have  to  follow  a  more 
formal  process  regarding  analysis,  specification,  developing 
and documentation. They should do more reflection on their 
work to discover inconsistencies during their decisions and not 
at  the  stage  of  delivering  the  prototypes  to  the  evaluators. 
Without our evaluation approach, we would not have found 
many  problems  at  this  early  stage.  This  also  allows  the 
developers to meet the project time plans and quality demands 
until the end of the project. A traditional CC evaluation would 
have  brought  up  these  problems  at  the  end  of  the  project, 
which would have endangered the success of the whole project 
beyond its deadline. 
Our first application of the CC based early evaluation process 
discovered  many  design  and  documentation  inconsistencies 
and surfaced several implementation problems. It therefore can 
be regarded as a success. After our next step  education of 
developers  about  accurate  analysis  and documentation  we 
are  looking  forward  the  next  assurance  cycle  in  December 
2005 to get deeper insight in the usefulness of our evaluation 
process.  The  results  so  far  suggest  that  it  supports  early 
security  fault  detection  and  removal,  which  according  to 
section I.A will lead to lower cost of the software engineering 
process. 
Much work has yet to be done. After a few more applications 
of our process to software development, the economic effects 
of its application should be monitored in a real project. Also, 
some  research  among  the  developers  about  the  cost  of 
educating  and  motivating  them  to  model  according  to  CC 
requirements should be performed.  Finally, modeling our CC 
based approach into a procedure like the clean room software 
development process might lead to a widely applicable model 
for security assurance by early assurance in software projects. 
This finally could be compared against other methods of early 
validation. 
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